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Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex
discrimination by programs receiving federal education funding.1 Primary
responsibility for administering that statute lies in the Office for Civil Rights
of the Department of Education (OCR).
Because Title IX involves a subject that remains highly controversial in
our polity (sex roles and interactions among the sexes more generally), and
because it targets a highly sensitive area (education), OCR’s administration
of the statute has long drawn criticism. The critics have not merely noted
disagreements with the legal and policy decisions of the agency, however.
Rather, they have attacked the agency’s decisions for being illegitimate—for
reflecting the agency’s improper imposition of value judgments on the
statute. Three key applications of Title IX have drawn the most controversy
in this regard: gender equity in intercollegiate athletics; transgender students’
rights; and sex-based harassment and assault on college campuses.
In this essay, I argue that the critique is misplaced. One may agree or
disagree with OCR’s applications of Title IX in these three key areas. But
these applications are not illegitimate. To the contrary, they are
implementation decisions made consistent with the longstanding “core”
conception of discrimination—intentional disparate treatment.2 These
* Frank G. Millard Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender for soliciting this essay, and to the journal’s
editors for incredibly helpful comments.
1 20 U.S.C. §1681 (2012).
2 Anti-discrimination rules, like equality rules generally, can be cashed out in
multiple distinct ways. See generally George Rutherglen, Discrimination and Its
Discontents, 81 VA. L. REV. 117 (1995) (describing the “concept of discrimination” as
“essentially contested”). Doug Rae and his colleagues, for example, identified 108
structurally distinct conceptions of equality. See DOUGLAS W. RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES
133 (1981). Much of the controversy regarding the application of anti-discrimination law
rests on disagreements regarding which conception of anti-discrimination is the right one.
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
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decisions are inherently contestable, because even the “core” conception
can be instantiated in many ways.  But there are strong reasons to believe
that OCR is best positioned to choose which instantiations to adopt.
In Part I, I demonstrate that the controversial positions of OCR do not
involve avant garde interpretations of the anti-discrimination principle.
Rather, they involve the resolution of questions of implementation: From
what facts is it reasonable to draw an inference of disparate treatment? In
what activities do we predict male and female college students would want
to participate if they did not face discrimination? Should we look at
discrimination on the level of the individual student or the institution as a
whole? And what is the most effective way to reduce individuals’ acts of
discrimination within an educational program?
In Part II, I argue that OCR is well positioned to decide these questions.
These questions of implementation are precisely the sorts of questions that
Congress cannot generally be expected to resolve. And they are the sorts of
questions on which an agency like OCR plausibly has both an informational
and a democratic advantage over the courts.
My argument does not rely on any transcendent preference for
administrative resolution of policy questions—though it may offer a data
point in support of such a preference. Rather, it relies on two key factors:
first, the inherently contestable nature of these questions of implementation;
and second, the proven democratic accountability of OCR. In a companion
piece, I argue that OCR has generally been accountable to the public in its
interpretations of Title IX.3 Here, I focus on the contestable nature of the
implementation decisions that are necessary to give life to the statute, and I
compare the democratic responsiveness of OCR with that of Congress and
the courts.
I. IMPLEMENTING THE “CORE” CONCEPTION OF DISCRIMINATION
Title IX generally provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”4 OCR has drawn controversy in its
application of this text in three key areas: the slots universities allocate to
men’s and women’s intercollegiate sports; the rights of transgender students
2507, 2526–32 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (detailing dispute over adopting a
disparate-impact conception of discrimination); see generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972
(1990) (cataloguing discrimination legislation from 1960–1972). By contrast, I will
argue, the controversy regarding Title IX is notable precisely because both OCR’s
positions and the positions of OCR’s critics rest on the narrow “core” conception.
3 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, This is What Democracy Looks Like: Title IX and the
Legitimacy of the Administrative State, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2020).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
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in elementary, secondary, and higher education; and the response of colleges
to sexual harassment and assault against students.5
In each of these areas, critics contend that OCR has impermissibly
stretched the concept of discrimination. To the contrary, I argue, OCR’s in-
terpretations rest on a straightforward understanding of that concept. Indeed,
they rest on the widely understood “core meaning” of discrimination, which
connotes the “intent to distinguish two or more groups on the basis of some
specified characteristic.”6 A defense of OCR’s interpretations thus does not
in any way turn on the resolution of the long-running conflict over whether
anti-discrimination laws prohibit actions with an unjustified disparate
impact.
But OCR’s critics, too, have a perfectly analytically tractable argument
under the disparate treatment principle. The controversies thus do not turn on
what definition of discrimination one adopts. Instead, they highlight that
even the supposed core of that concept is itself contestable. In its “core”
meaning, discrimination means dissimilar treatment of similarly situated
people. But determining who is similarly situated requires resolution of both
empirical and normative questions that the concept of discrimination cannot
answer. The debate over OCR’s application of Title IX to college athletics
offers an example of this problem. The agency’s longstanding position rests
on a particular prediction of what the preferences of female students would
be in the absence of discrimination.
Identifying dissimilar treatment and similarly situated comparators also
turns on the level of generality at which the relevant act is framed. And
again, the concept of discrimination cannot, analytically, tell us what level of
generality to use.7 The debate over OCR’s application of Title IX to trans-
gender students raises precisely this “levels-of-abstraction problem.” The
5 See generally R. SHEP MELNICK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING
GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION (2018) (a recent book-length criticism of OCR’s treat-
ment of these three issues). For further discussions of one or the other of these issues, see
David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the Administrative State: A Skeptic’s
Look at Administrative Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1387–92
(2019) (discussing campus sexual harassment and assault); David E. Bernstein, The
Abuse of Executive Power: Getting Beyond the Streetlight Effect, 11 FLA. INT’L U. L.
REV. 289, 290–98 (2016) (same); Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 881, 931–46 (2016) (same); Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen,
Ironies, Inconsistencies, and Intercollegiate Athletics: Title IX, Title VII, and Statistical
Evidence of Discrimination, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 177 (1999) (athletics).
6 Rutherglen, supra note 2, at 118; see also id. at 127 (“‘Discrimination,’ as it is
ordinarily used, refers to a process of noticing or marking a difference, often for evalua-
tive purposes. The two most common synonyms for the verb ‘discriminate’ are ‘distin-
guish’ and ‘differentiate,’ which in turn denote recognizing, discerning, appreciating, or
identifying a difference.”).
7 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58
DUKE L.J. 345, 360 n.74 (2008) (noting that “the ‘levels-of-abstraction problem’ is com-
mon in constitutional adjudication, and it arises especially frequently when applying the-
ories of equal treatment”) (citations omitted) (quoting Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholar-
ship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084–85 (1981)).
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position OCR took in the Obama Administration, interpreting the ban on sex
discrimination to protect transgender students, rested in part on viewing dis-
crimination at the level of the individual student, rather than at the level of a
school as a whole.
Finally, even if we have a consistent understanding of what constitutes
discrimination, we also face a separate question of how to attribute responsi-
bility when the law regulates a corporate or collective entity. Whose actions
count as those of the entity? Only the formal corporate actions of the entity’s
highest governing body? The informal actions of high-level employees? The
actions of all supervisors? Of all employees? Of others who work or do
business at the entity’s facilities (contractors, customers, students)? These are
questions that arise in the application of every anti-discrimination law.8 And
they are particularly acute given the text of Title IX, which, in the passive
voice, says that no person shall “be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”9
Whose acts of discrimination count when applying that language? What does
it mean to be subjected to discrimination “under” an education program?
The debate over OCR’s application of Title IX to campus sexual assault and
harassment raises this set of questions.
A. Resolving Empirical and Predictive Questions: College Athletics
In implementing Title IX in sports, OCR and the courts have adopted a
test that presses universities toward providing varsity athletic slots for men
and women in proportion to the enrollment of members of each sex.10 Critics
have charged that this test unduly focuses on varsity sports. The most sus-
tained critique of OCR’s approach to Title IX comes from Shep Melnick,
who offered a book-length challenge to the agency’s implementation of the
statute. He suggests that a better test would “look[ ] at the full array of
athletic activities that schools offer, ranging from varsity and jayvee teams
to club and intramural sports to recreational and fitness programs.”11 After
all, he notes, “male and female students might have a different array of
athletic interests.”12 If women are “more interested in athletic activities that
they can continue to enjoy for many decades,” and men “focus on team
sports that few will be able to play after graduation,” he suggests, there
would be no sex discrimination if a school focused its women’s sports
budget on non-varsity (and even non-competitive) activities while devoting
8 See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Formalism and Employer Liability Under Title
VII, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 145 (2014) (discussing the problem as it arises under Title
VII).
9 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
10 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 166 (1st Cir. 1996).
11
MELNICK, supra note 5, at 80. R
12 Id.
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more of its men’s sports budget to competitive, varsity activities.13 Such a
school would be equally serving the interests of male and female students,
and thus not discriminating based on sex.14
This is a perfectly tractable understanding of discrimination. To be sure,
it relies on viewing the problem at a particular level of generality. It requires
us to look at the offerings of a college overall, to take for granted that sex-
segregated teams are acceptable,15 and to ask whether, on average, the school
enables female students to satisfy their interests (in athletic opportunities, or
in opportunities generally) as much as it enables male students to satisfy
their interests. If women in general have less of an interest in participating in
varsity athletics than do men, then requiring that schools allocate varsity
athletic slots to men and women in proportion to their population gives fe-
male athletes something more than male athletes receive—each female ath-
lete has a greater opportunity to satisfy her preferences than does each male
athlete.
The key to that argument is the premise that women have less of an
interest in participating in varsity athletics than do men. But one’s interest in
participating in a given activity is not an inherent trait. It is a trait that often
depends significantly on the opportunities that are available. It is well estab-
lished that “people tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities.”16
“The victims of inequality,” in particular, “tend to reduce dissonance by
adapting their preferences to the available opportunities.”17 People are,
therefore, less likely to express interest in participating in an activity when it
is not available to them. But that does not mean that they do not wish to
participate in it—or would not wish to participate in it if it were available.
Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson made a similar point in arguing against
a supposed lack-of-interest defense under Title VII:
13 See id.
14 Melnick also suggests that the prevailing test actually discriminates against female
students, though this seems more a matter of disparate impact than of disparate treatment.
He argues that the test effectively requires schools to invest more money and admissions
slots into intercollegiate varsity athletics at the expense of academic and other extracur-
ricular activities: “More money for athletic scholarships means fewer scholarships for
those who shine academically and for those in financial need. More slots for athletes
means fewer for musicians, social entrepreneurs, and the most serious and gifted schol-
ars.” Id. at 84. And “given female students’ superior academic performance,” he argues
that “it is likely to be nonathlete female undergraduates and applicants” who pay the
price. Id. Because this argument does not rest on the “core” concept of discrimination, I
do not discuss it further in text.
15 For an interesting discussion of the not-taken path of sex-integrationism in Title
IX’s application to athletics, see Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in Public, 129
YALE L.J. 78, 130–36 (2019).
16
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109
(1987).
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 759 (1991).
For a general discussion of the normative questions the adaptive-preference phenomenon
raises for the use of preferences as a source of policy or measure of justice, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability,
60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 773–95 (2007).
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Because people’s ‘interest’ in particular jobs and the sources of that
interest are intangible factors that elude direct measurement and
proof, the lack of interest defense invites courts to adopt the same
sort of overbroad generalizations about women and minorities that
Title VII has been construed to prohibit in other contexts.18
For this reason, anti-discrimination law doctrine has sought to guard
against treating the preferences or interests of women or members of minor-
ity group as static. In one of the Supreme Court’s earliest Title VII cases, the
Court held that individuals who did not apply for a job could challenge an
employer’s discriminatory policy if they could show that the prospect of dis-
crimination deterred them from making an application.19 Courts apply the
same principle today.20
In applying Title IX to college athletics, OCR and the courts have
sought to respond to the same sorts of dynamics. As Deborah Brake argues,
“allowing institutions to justify the allocation of fewer opportunities to fe-
male athletes on the grounds that girls and women are less interested in sport
would enable them to justify an unequal allocation of opportunities based on
their own practices that have suppressed female interest.”21 The relevant Ti-
tle IX regulation requires schools to “provide equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes.”22 The regulation goes on to explain that equal ac-
commodation of the interests of male and female students is key. In enumer-
ating the factors the agency should consider “[i]n determining whether
equal opportunities are available,” it gives pride of place to “[w]hether the
selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”23
The dominant “three-part test,” set forth in OCR guidance and adopted
by the courts, implements this regulation by seeking to identify when the
interests of men and women have been equally accommodated. When “in-
tercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective en-
rollments,” the test concludes that no discrimination has occurred.24 Propor-
tional representation strongly suggests that the school has equally
18 Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1078–79 (1992); see also Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing
Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 814 (1989) (arguing that a lack-of-interest defense “en-
shrin[es] gender stereotypes at the core of Title VII”).
19 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367–68 (1977).
20 See, e.g., Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013); EEOC v. Joe’s
Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002).
21 Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title
IX, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 71 (2001).
22 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2019).
23 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2019).
24 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
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accommodated the interests of both sexes. But the test recognizes that the
lack of proportional representation, while potentially raising concerns about
unequal accommodation of interests, is not dispositive. Thus, in the absence
of proportional representation it permits a school to show compliance in one
of two ways: either by showing “a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest
and abilities of the members of [the ‘underrepresented’] sex,” or by directly
demonstrating “that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.”25
Although the three-part test presses toward proportional representation,
then, it does not require it—and it provides schools meaningful opportunities
to show that they have accommodated student interest in the absence of pro-
portional representation. The test effectively erects a pair of nested presump-
tions. The first presumption is this: If a school is not providing proportionate
varsity athletic opportunities, then it is likely—but not certainly—failing to
equally accommodate the interests of each sex. The second presumption is
this: If a school is neither providing proportionate opportunities nor taking
steps to meet the demonstrated interest of the underrepresented sex, then we
can be comfortable in concluding that it is failing to equally accommodate
the interests of each sex.
Those presumptions rest on a perhaps contestable factual assumption—
that in the absence of discrimination male and female students would have
equal interests in participating in varsity athletics. Melnick derides that as-
sumption as an “abstract, dogmatic” assertion rather than one rooted in
fact.26 Even some who are more sympathetic than Melnick to the use of Title
IX to expand women’s varsity athletic opportunities have suggested that the
if-you-build-it-they-will-come assumption goes too far.27 On the flip side,
there is ample evidence that, as women’s varsity athletic opportunities have
expanded, the interest of female students in those opportunities has increased
apace.28
The crucial point, however, is this: That dispute is a factual one—and it
is one that is difficult in principle to resolve, turning as it does on hypotheti-
cal questions of how expanded opportunities will affect female students’ in-
terests. Whoever resolves the dispute will do so based on inherently
contestable empirical predictions, necessarily informed by one’s substantive
views of the importance of addressing the intangible factors that deny oppor-
25 Id.
26
MELNICK, supra note 5, at 83. R
27 See generally, B. Glenn George, Forfeit: Opportunity, Choice, and Discrimination
Theory Under Title IX, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2010) (illustrating how Title IX by
itself is not enough to eradicate discrimination in sports).
28 See Brake, supra note 21, at 15. R
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tunities.29 But either resolution of the dispute is consistent with the “core”
understanding of discrimination.30
B. The Level-of-Abstraction Problem: The Rights
of Transgender Students
Before the Trump Administration reversed course, OCR interpreted Ti-
tle IX to provide that discrimination against transgender students was imper-
missible sex discrimination.31 At least one court agreed with that position,
though the appeal from its decision was short-circuited.32
Critics asserted that the Obama OCR’s position went beyond the statu-
tory prohibition on sex discrimination. In the mine run of transgender dis-
crimination cases, defendants were not claiming the right to exclude
transgender students entirely from school. Instead, they were insisting that
transgender students use restrooms that accorded with the sex those students
were assigned at birth.33 Because Title IX explicitly permits schools to segre-
gate restrooms based on sex, critics ask how it can possibly be impermissible
sex discrimination to require transgender students to use one restroom rather
than another.34 And some see any discrimination as effectively de minimis.
Melnick, for example, asserts that “the link to educational opportunity here
is attenuated at best: the central issue is access to bathrooms and locker
rooms, not classrooms; the number of students affected is tiny, and none of
them have been denied access to anything even vaguely curricular in na-
ture.”35 The position of President Obama’s appointees, he argues, was rooted
in an effort to “update decades-old legislation to comport with their under-
standing of ‘progress.’” 36 He contends that President Obama’s appointees
29 Deborah Brake argues that Title IX has been successful in creating athletic oppor-
tunities for women precisely because it has been applied in a pragmatic, nondogmatic
way. See Deborah L. Brake, Title IX as Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 513,
535 (2007).
30 To be sure, one can defend OCR’s approach to athletics based on a broader concep-
tion of discrimination. For an outstanding analysis that concludes that the best defense
rests on principles of fair distribution in education, as well as on the “perfectionist”
argument that OCR’s approach “encourages girls to develop socially valued traits and
attributes associated with competitive athletics—for example physical skills, and a gen-
eral sense of personal agency,” see Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me:
Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions
Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 737 (2003).
31 See Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students from Catherine E. Lhamon,
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. & Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 3 (May 13, 2016), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf,
[perma.cc/EZN8-S4S8].
32 See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 723 (4th Cir.
2016), vacated and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
33 See e.g., MELNICK, supra note 5, at 230. R
34 See id.
35 Id. at 240.
36 Id. at 20.
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sought to transform Title IX “from a law designed to prevent schools from
establishing educational practices that exclude or disadvantage female stu-
dents to a far more sweeping effort to eliminate all forms of ‘sex stereotyp-
ing.’” 37 He describes the Obama Administration’s position as reflecting a
broad effort at social engineering, rather than the mere application of the
anti-discrimination principle:
Sexual stereotyping—which can include virtually all conventional
thinking about sex and gender—must be identified, condemned,
and corrected. Outmoded stereotypes about “masculinity and fem-
ininity”—based as they are on a mistaken bimodal, biological un-
derstanding of gender—should be replaced by an understanding
that recognizes both the fluidity and the socially constructed nature
of gender. Shortly after she left OCR, Assistant Secretary Cathe-
rine Lhamon told an interviewer, “The bathroom question never
was just about a bathroom. It is about who that child is at school
and how that child will be perceived and seen.” Any stigma that
currently attaches to transgender status must be eliminated, which
means changing how transgender students are “perceived and
seen” by other students and school officials.38
Despite this florid description, a prohibition on acts driven by sex stereo-
types reflects a straightforward application of the “core” conception of dis-
crimination. To be sure, the Supreme Court did not formally recognize the
sex stereotyping theory of anti-discrimination liability until its 1989 decision
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.39  But that fact can be deceiving. If a busi-
ness requires women, but not men, to act in a demure way to obtain a pro-
motion, it has discriminated against women in the “core” sense. A woman
who is denied a promotion for failing to conform to that stereotype, like Ann
Hopkins, has experienced negative treatment that she would not have exper-
ienced had she been a man. On the “core” understanding of discrimination
as treating similarly situated people differently based on a forbidden charac-
teristic, a case like Hopkins’s is readily understood as one of sex
discrimination.
And that is true even if an employer requires both male and female
employees to conform equally to the stereotypes it attaches to their respec-
tive sexes (a prospect that may be more hypothetical than real). This is
where the levels-of-abstraction problem comes in. If one considers things at
a high level of abstraction, and looks at the overall opportunities for men and
women at a workplace, it may appear that the enforcement of sex stereotypes
against both sexes means there is no discrimination—men face some barriers
that women don’t, but women face an equal and opposite set of barriers that
37 Id. at 236.
38 Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
39 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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men don’t.40 Closer to the ground, though—considering the treatment of an
individual employee—it appears that there is discrimination: A woman who
is denied a promotion because she does not conform to a stereotype about
how women should act has suffered negative treatment that she would not
have experienced if her sex were different. She has experienced a violation
of the “core” of the anti-discrimination concept. And the same is true of a
man at the same workplace who is denied a promotion because he does not
conform to a stereotype about how men should act. On this understanding, a
workplace can simultaneously discriminate against both men and women
because of their sex.
Whether an employer who enforces stereotypes against both sexes can
be said to discriminate, then, does not depend on whether one accepts or
rejects the “core” understanding of discrimination as disparate treatment.
One can accept that understanding and reach either conclusion. The differ-
ence between the two conclusions rests on the level of generality at which
the case is framed: the level of the overall workplace or the level of the
individual employee. And the anti-discrimination principle itself cannot tell
us what level of generality to apply. American anti-discrimination law has
tended to look to the individual level,41 but that is not invariably the case.42
It is not hard to see how the sex stereotyping analysis can be applied to
protect transgender students against discrimination under Title IX. If a
school punishes a transgender female student because she does not identify
or present herself as male (in terms of dress or the facilities she uses), but it
does not visit the same negative treatment on a cisgender female student, one
might be tempted to say that the basis of discrimination is gender identity
rather than sex. That is particularly true if a school requires all students to
identify and present themselves according to the sex they were assigned at
birth. Such a policy, one might say, disadvantages neither female nor male
students.
But that conclusion depends on framing the matter at a high level of
abstraction. From the level of the individual transgender female student, the
discrimination is apparent: If she had been assigned the female sex at birth,
she would not be treated negatively for identifying and presenting as female;
40 Of course, this presumes that the barriers are equal and opposite. In many cases
that will not be true. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at
Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation As an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV.
1111, 1134 (2006) (discussing Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th
Cir. 2006), and noting that “anyone with ordinary experience in life knows that women
would spend much more time and money applying the large quantity of makeup, styling
their hair, and polishing their nails than men would in simply combing their hair and
trimming their nails”). And even equally-applied stereotypes will often hinder women
more than men, simply because the male stereotypes are better aligned with qualities
valued in the workplace, such as initiative or hard-charging.
41 See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708–09
(1978).
42 See, e.g., Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 (upholding disparate sex-based grooming
standards).
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but because she was assigned the male sex at birth, she is treated negatively.
As in the case of an employer that enforces sex-based stereotypes on both
men and women, the case for a violation of the “core” anti-discrimination
principle is apparent when the matter is considered at a low level of
abstraction.
A wrinkle in the analysis arises, however, when we consider the factual
context of most of the Title IX disputes regarding transgender students—
access to bathrooms. Title IX’s regulations explicitly permit sex-segregated
bathrooms.43 If we understand this as a bathroom exception from the anti-
discrimination principle, then transgender students simply have no claim.
Even if barring them from the facilities designated for the gender with which
they identify would constitute discrimination, on this theory there would be
no anti-discrimination principle to apply.
But there is a better way of understanding the regulations permitting
sex-segregated bathrooms. These regulations should be seen as defining
what discrimination is, rather than identifying certain circumstances in
which discrimination will be permitted. Sex-segregated restrooms are always
sex-based, but they need not count as “discrimination” unless they cause a
harm. For most people, sex-segregated restrooms (so long as they are other-
wise equal) impose no material or stigmatic harm. (This is very different, of
course, from race-segregated bathrooms.) But for transgender individuals,
being forced to use the restroom assigned to a sex other than the one with
which they identify causes serious harm. Because these students are ex-
cluded from particular bathrooms because of the sex they were assigned at
birth—clearly a sex-based distinction—and the exclusion causes them serious
harm, their treatment is readily characterized as sex discrimination.44
Of course, this is not the only way to understand the issue. As with sex
stereotyping generally, if one looks at the matter from a high level of gener-
ality, it is possible to see no sex discrimination here, because both male and
female students face similar barriers. But from an individual-level perspec-
tive, the argument for sex discrimination is straightforward. And both per-
spectives rest on the “core” understanding of discrimination.
C. The Institutional-Responsibility Problem: Campus Sexual
Assault and Harassment
Perhaps no aspect of Title IX jurisprudence has been more controversial
than the statute’s application to sexual assault and harassment on campus.
The Obama Administration took an aggressive position on this issue. It is-
sued subregulatory guidance and entered settlement agreements that sought
43 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2019).
44 See generally Brief for Professors Samuel Bagenstos, Michael C. Dorf, Martin S.
Lederman & Leah M. Litman as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Gloucester Cty.
Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273), 2017 WL 894898
(U.S. 2017) (providing a more fully developed version of this argument).
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to require universities to beef up their protections of students who experi-
ence assault and harassment.45 Those actions drew a sharp response—from
advocates who believed that the new approach deprived accused students of
important procedural protections,46 and ultimately from the Trump Adminis-
tration, which has reversed key aspects of the Obama approach.47
Interestingly, though, none of this controversy has challenged the
Obama OCR’s interpretation of the anti-discrimination principle. Sex-based
harassment or assault violates the “core” conception of that principle on a
fairly straightforward theory—the aggressor targets the victim for harm
based on the victim’s sex.48 The controversy is about attribution: When
should we attribute the discriminatory act of a student to the educational
institution? In the terms set forth by the statute, when is discrimination by a
student against another student discrimination under the school’s “education
program or activity”?49
A subsidiary, but important, controversy has been about due process:
When OCR has urged schools to adopt procedures to identify and sanction
students who commit harassment or assault, do those procedures provide
appropriate protection to the accused? In this essay, I focus on the attribution
question for two reasons. First, it is logically prior to the due process ques-
tion. The agency’s basis for pressing schools to adopt particular procedures
depends on the conclusion that acts of harassment or assault would be attrib-
utable to a school that does not adopt them. Second, virtually nobody—not
even the agency itself—has suggested that OCR should have the final word
on whether its chosen processes provide due process. That is a constitutional
question, on which the courts will necessarily have the last word. My focus
here is on the questions of statutory construction and implementation.
Under President Obama, OCR answered the attribution question by
saying that a school is responsible for discriminatory harassment or assault
by one student against another when it does not adopt adequate procedures
to prevent and punish that discrimination.50 The Trump Administration has
concluded that the procedural requirements imposed by the Obama OCR
45 See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 5, at 149–53; Karen M. Tani, An Administrative R
Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title IX Enforcement in Historical and Institu-
tional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1874–75 (2017).
46 See Tani, supra note 45, at 1852 (describing criticisms of OCR’s actions). R
47 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,464–66 (Nov. 29, 2018)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
48 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1999); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
49 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
50 See “Dear Colleague” Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil
Rights 3–4 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf [perma.cc/9LWW-SPR5]; Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t Of Educ.,
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 1–3 (2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [perma.cc/9LBT-
WRNW] [hereinafter Questions and Answers].
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were too extensive.51 But it does not appear to disagree with the proposition
that the failure to provide adequate procedures will make a school responsi-
ble for a student’s discrimination against another.52
At least where private actors are suing for money damages under Title
IX, the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat different view of institutional
responsibility. The Court has said that, in a private damages action, a school
is responsible for acts of discriminatory harassment when it “is deliberately
indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the
harasser is under the school’s disciplinary authority.”53 And deliberate indif-
ference requires a showing that the school’s “response to the harassment or
lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”54
The Obama Administration stated that the deliberate-indifference standard
did not apply to administrative enforcement of Title IX.55 But either way, the
controversy over the Obama Administration’s guidelines has centered on the
question of when a school can be held responsible for discriminatory harass-
ment of a student—not on whether the harassment is discriminatory in the
first place.
It should be obvious that this is not a question that the anti-discrimina-
tion principle can answer. Whether or not a school is ultimately held respon-
sible, we would not even be asking the attribution question unless the
harassment constituted discrimination. The answer to the attribution question
turns on broader issues of policy, and in particular of the need to find effec-
tive tools to prevent and remedy discriminatory harassment without impos-
ing undue costs to academic freedom or the procedural interests of alleged
perpetrators. Given the importance of the interests on all sides, virtually any
resolution of these issues is likely to be extremely controversial. But that
does not mean that OCR has in any way gone beyond the “core” of the anti-
discrimination principle.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF OCR’S ACTIONS
In the previous part, I argued that the controversies over OCR’s applica-
tions of Title IX do not involve disputes over whether to extend beyond the
“core” conception of discrimination. Rather, they involve empirical and pre-
dictive questions, disagreements about the level of abstraction at which we
will assess discrimination, and questions of whose discrimination to attribute
to a school. The anti-discrimination principle incorporated in the statute does
not resolve any of those questions.
51 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 83 Fed. Reg. 61,462, 61,464–66.
52 See id. at 61,465.
53 Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.
54 Id. at 648.
55 Questions and Answers, supra note 50, at 1 n.9. R
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In this part, I turn more directly to the current critique of the legitimacy
of OCR’s actions.  I begin by highlighting the ways that the critique of OCR
replicates the broader conservative attack on the legitimacy of the adminis-
trative state.  Informed by the debate over that broader attack, I then argue
that OCR is likely to be the entity that is best positioned to resolve the inher-
ently contestable questions involved in implementing Title IX’s anti-discrim-
ination principle.
The interpretations OCR has offered in the three key areas I have dis-
cussed in this essay are no doubt contestable. Precisely because the statute’s
anti-discrimination principle does not answer the relevant questions, one can
readily argue that OCR has gotten it wrong in the ways it has filled the gaps.
But the critiques of OCR have not merely asserted that the agency has gotten
it wrong. Rather, they insist that the agency’s actions have been illegitimate.
Melnick, for example, argues that OCR has adopted a reading of Title IX
that would promote major social change, and that Congress never specifi-
cally endorsed the prospect that the law would have such a significant conse-
quence. As a result, he suggests, the agency has gone beyond its legitimate
authority.56
These criticisms of OCR resonate with the conservative position in to-
day’s broader debates about administrative law. As conservative judges and
scholars have sharpened their challenges to the administrative state over the
past several decades, they have increasingly attacked the delegation of major
policy decisions to the Executive Branch by Congress.57 Their attacks have
entered the doctrine through the “major questions” exception to Chevron
deference.58 And recent opinions by Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh sug-
gest that, if the Supreme Court revives a version of the constitutional
nondelegation doctrine, it will do so by forbidding delegations that send
such major questions to administrative agencies.59
56 See MELNICK, supra note 5, at 236–43, 263. R
57 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014);
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
58 See, e.g., Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 52–53 (2010) (describing the “elephants in mouseholes” canon as
deriving from nondelegation concerns); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as
a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 237 (describing FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)—a leading example of the major-questions
exception—as deriving from nondelegation concerns); see generally Note, Major Ques-
tion Objections, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2191 (2016) (critiquing the “major questions”
doctrine).
59 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(stating that “as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private
conduct, it may authorize another branch to ‘fill up the details’”); Paul v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (stating
that “Justice Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points that may war-
rant further consideration in future cases,” and interpreting that opinion not to permit
delegation of “major policy question[s] of great economic and political importance”).
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Defenders of the administrative state have, in turn, challenged both the
broader conservative attack and the specific doctrinal responses.60 I am
largely sympathetic to those broader defenses of the administrative state, but
this brief symposium essay is not the place to discuss them in detail. Still,
perhaps a couple of aspects of the Title IX experience might be of interest to
participants in the broader conversation.
Start with the following observation: In the civil rights era (roughly
beginning with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), the most
intense political, judicial, and academic debates have involved the proper
conception of discrimination—and particularly whether discrimination
should be understood in terms of intent or effect.61 Yet the most intense de-
bates over Title IX do not raise that issue at all. As I showed in Part I, even
the most aggressive positions taken by OCR are fully consistent with the
narrow “core” conception of discrimination as disparate treatment. Yet those
positions have triggered significant controversy for effecting major social
changes.
The questions that have caused such controversy under Title IX have
largely been questions of implementation: When discrimination has gone on
for years, how do we assess its effect in discouraging its victims from seek-
ing opportunities (college athletics)? Do we identify instances of discrimina-
tion at the individual level or at the level of the overall program (transgender
students’ rights)? And when an individual discriminates against a student in
an educational program, how do we determine whether to attribute that indi-
vidual’s discrimination to the school (sexual harassment and assault)?62
Whoever applies Title IX’s non-discrimination requirement must an-
swer questions like these. The answers are unlikely to be dictated by the
statutory text, nor will broader legal principles compel an answer one way or
another. The legal system thus has two choices: The courts may render Title
IX’s non-discrimination requirement inoperative until Congress specifies the
answers to these questions.  They may accomplish this end by applying ei-
ther a constitutional non-delegation doctrine or a canon of narrow interpreta-
tion that is informed by non-delegation principles. Or the legal system may
accept that some other entity, whether an agency or a court, will fill in these
details.
One might argue that I am describing the first option in too-extreme
terms. Perhaps applying the non-delegation doctrine would not render Title
IX totally inoperative because the statute could apply in any case in which
60 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword:
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017)
(presenting the most magisterial defense to date of the administrative state).
61 See supra note 2. R
62 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference:
A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501
(2005) (providing an important argument that many of the disputes that appear to be
about statutory interpretation are better understood as focusing on questions of
implementation).
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the unresolved implementation questions did not arise. The problem, though,
is that those implementation questions are likely to arise in an incredibly
broad range of cases. Many cases turn on what inferences of discrimination
can be drawn from ambiguous evidence; it is impossible to resolve those
cases without having a baseline empirical understanding of what sorts of
actions raise plausible or strong inferences of discrimination. Many other
cases turn on attribution: Is a professor’s act of discrimination attributable to
a school? An admissions officer’s? What if these acts are in conflict with
policy statements adopted by the highest corporate bodies of the school? It is
only in rare cases in which one can avoid the implementation issues.
To require Congress to anticipate and specify answers to these ques-
tions is to impose a substantial hurdle to achieving the basic goal of non-
discrimination—the basic goal that, everyone agrees, Congress endorsed in
adopting Title IX. Many of these questions cannot be fully anticipated, at
least in their crucial details, in advance of the application of the statute to
particular facts. To hold up operation of the statute in areas raising them will
delay achievement of the non-discrimination goal at the same time as it im-
poses a great burden on Congress to continually add detail to the law. Politi-
cal polarization might in fact prevent Congress from responding and thus
ensure that the operation of the statute will be held up indefinitely.63
The courts have taken a different tack. Where Title IX’s text leaves
open significant implementation questions, they have not refused to enforce
the statute. Rather, they have provided the answers to these questions them-
selves. The lower courts have sometimes deferred to OCR’s implementation
decisions—most notably in the intercollegiate athletics cases.64 But the Su-
preme Court has tended to go its own way. The Court has treated these
implementation questions as issues of statutory interpretation that judges
should have the primary role in deciding. Thus, the Court has rejected OCR’s
views about institutional liability and adopted its own actual-knowledge-
plus-deliberate-indifference test.65 And even when it has agreed with the
agency—as it did in determining that retaliation was a form of sex discrimi-
nation prohibited by Title IX—it has done so on the basis of its own indepen-
dent interpretation of the statute.66
63 See Tani, supra note 45, at 1895 (suggesting that political polarization in Congress R
will prevent it from adopting amendments that update Title IX); see generally Richard L.
Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress,
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013) (discussing the effects of polarization on the power of
Congress relative to the Supreme Court).
64 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996).
65 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 282–85, 290 (1998)
(rejecting aided-by-the-agency-relationship standard for institutional liability that ap-
peared in OCR guidance).
66 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (holding that
Title IX prohibits retaliation, and stating that “we do not rely on the Department of Edu-
cation’s regulation at all, because the statute itself contains the necessary prohibition”).
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There is a strong argument, however, that it is OCR that is best posi-
tioned to decide these implementation questions. That argument is the two-
pronged one familiar from longstanding debates in administrative law: that
an agency is likely to develop greater expertise on the policy issues underly-
ing implementation, and that the agency is likely to be more politically re-
sponsive than the courts.67 The questions that have caused the greatest
controversy in Title IX law are not strictly matters of legal interpretation.
Their answers are not dictated by statutory text or legislative purpose. They
require empirical and predictive judgments about the frequency of discrimi-
nation and the most effective means of preventing it, as well as the resolu-
tion of normative questions about how to balance the various interests at
stake. Judges are generalists who are constrained by the evidence presented
by the parties to a case; they are unlikely to have as strong a basis for mak-
ing empirical and predictive judgments as that of agency officials. And if
judges balance the interests incorrectly, the only remedy is the onerous one
of correction by Congress. Agency officials, by contrast, work for the Presi-
dent and can thus be expected to be politically responsive.
All of this, as I said, is familiar. And it has been subject to a familiar
line of attack by skeptics of the administrative state. Those skeptics argue
that agency staff, driven by a narrow mission orientation, will steamroll their
political superiors, override other important interests, and even disregard le-
gal limitations to promote their desired outcomes. Much of the criticism of
OCR’s implementation of Title IX has followed that template. Critics argue
that OCR has used Title IX to impose an extreme social agenda, one not
rooted in the statute, and that the agency’s actions have disregarded impor-
tant interests held by those regulated by the law.68
As I have shown above, however, it is not fair to say that OCR has
exceeded the limitations of Title IX. It has instead resolved implementation
questions that the statute’s non-discrimination rule does not answer. And in
resolving those questions, it has not evaded democratic accountability.
Rather, as I show extensively in other work, OCR has balanced the relevant
interests in the full light of day.69 In so doing, it has triggered important
public debates. And when its decisions have drawn sufficient public opposi-
tion, the political appointees who run the agency have reversed them. When
the Obama-era OCR’s pronouncements on transgender rights and campus
sexual assault triggered major public controversies, they found their way
into the 2016 presidential race. After the election of President Trump, the
agency withdrew the Obama-era transgender rights policy and prepared new
regulations to displace the Obama-era sexual assault policy. OCR has thus
been a venue for democratic deliberation over Title IX’s implementation
67 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 60, at 77–87. R
68 See supra text accompanying note 5. R
69 The remainder of this paragraph summarizes the argument in Bagenstos, supra
note 3. R
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questions. Considerations of democratic accountability thus suggest that the
agency should resolve those questions.
CONCLUSION
Unlike with other civil rights statutes, the most intense controversies
over Title IX have not involved disputes over which conception of discrimi-
nation to endorse. Indeed, the disputants on all sides of these controversies
have taken for granted the “core” conception of discrimination as inten-
tional disparate treatment. These controversies have instead involved issues
of implementation—issues that require assessment of empirical, predictive,
and policy questions that the non-discrimination principle cannot itself an-
swer. OCR is well positioned to answer these questions—indeed, plausibly
better positioned than any likely alternative decisionmaker—and the critics
are wrong to label its actions illegitimate.
